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This paper presents a discussion of the recent “ban” on combustible cladding that has been 19 
implemented in England following the Grenfell Tower fire. The “ban” is discussed in terms of its 20 
context within the existing regulatory system in England and is analysed in terms of the intended 21 
and unintended consequences. Key intended consequences are identified as: the prohibition of 22 
“Grenfell type” cladding; the “banning” of desktop studies for relevant buildings; and the ban of 23 
some forms of engineered timber construction. Unintended consequences include: the 24 
devaluation of private leaseholder’s homes; the potential for the problems with the construction 25 
industry to be perceived as “fixed”; and a raft of somewhat absurd administrative effects. We 26 
conclude that the ban has likely been effective in its overall aim but that its success is, ironically, 27 
inherently bound up with the efficacy of the very regulations that it was intended to fix. We also 28 
identify that the new “ban” is potentially susceptible to “gaming” by unscrupulous parties within 29 
the construction industry. 30 
Keywords 31 




1. Introduction 34 
On the 17th May 2018, Dame Judith Hackitt released her Final Report on the state of the UK’s 35 
construction industry. Hackitt took to the airwaves and attempted to present the findings of her 36 
report to Martha Kearney on the UK’s flagship news programme (Today, 2018). Things started 37 
well. Dame Judith managed to make her points about how the existing regulatory system was 38 
broken, that there were no clear assignments of responsibility, and that a wholesale culture 39 
change was required. However, things soon started to get trickier. Kearney continued to press 40 
Hackitt on why her report did not call for an outright ban on combustible materials. Dame Hackitt 41 
stumbled – “that gets us into very technical ground” – and continued to emphasise her point that 42 
“you have to go beyond simply specifying what can and can’t be used”. 43 
 44 
Dame Judith stuck to her principles. She steadfastly repeated her considered opinion – and a 45 
conclusion that represented many months of research by tens, if not hundreds, of civil servants. 46 
She reiterated her position that “it is more than about simply issuing a ban” and that there were 47 
fundamental systemic changes that she said were needed in the construction industry. 48 
 49 
However, the headlines were already written. Dame Judith’s failure to “ban combustible 50 
cladding” was the lead item for the rest of the morning. Member of Parliament David Lammy 51 
branded her review as a “betrayal and a whitewash” (Lammy, 2018). By lunchtime, under 52 
mounting pressure, the government caved (Apps, 2018). James Brokenshire, Secretary of State 53 
for Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) announced in parliament 54 
that the government would “consult on banning the use of combustible materials in cladding 55 
systems on high-rise residential buildings” (Brokenshire, 2018). 56 
 57 
As the day wore on, Dame Judith again presented her report. This time to Parliament’s Select 58 
Committee on Housing, Communities and Local Government. She made the case for an 59 
outcomes based system – whereby designers are held accountable for their solutions; but the 60 
members of the committee wanted to talk about the ban (Housing, Communities and Local 61 




Hackitt noted that “in spite of reams and reams of prescription, people are still doing things 64 
which the guidance says [they] should not be doing”. She also observed that “simply banning 65 
something from happening is no guarantee of compliance” and that this was “fundamental to 66 
what I have found in [the] review”. Hackitt stated that “if people attach too much reliance upon 67 
banning activities and particular materials as being a solution to this problem, it will create a 68 
false sense of security”. 69 
 70 
By this time, it was mid-afternoon. Seven hours previously Dame Hackitt had refused to call for 71 
a ban on combustible cladding. At around 15:45, hesitating before she spoke, Hackitt said that 72 
she was “pleased to see that the Secretary of State has announced today that he is going to 73 
consult on whether or not combustible materials will be banned”. As outsiders, we can only 74 
imagine the machinations that must have played out behind-the-scenes on 17th May 2018. 75 
 76 
That evening, on the BBC’s Question Time Programme (Question Time, 2018), Dominic Raab 77 
the Minister of State for Housing and Planning, came under pressure from Diane Abbot MP not 78 
to consult – but simply to issue a directive to ban combustible cladding immediately. He 79 
responded by highlighted the complexity of the issue – asking Diane Abbot “can you define 80 
combustible cladding for me right here and now in a way that is clear?”. Then he made the 81 
following statement: 82 
  83 
My commitment is that we understand the concern, we’ve listened to the expert review and 84 
report, but we will be looking to ban it. The question is the most effective way to do it so that we 85 
have effective regulations – not defective regulations that were the cause of this in the first 86 
place. 87 
 88 
Over the course of a single day, Her Majesty’s Government progressed from no ban, to a 89 
consultation on whether or not a ban was required, to a consultation on the most effective way 90 




The challenge of this latter question was addressed by Brian Martin of MHCLG during a keynote 93 
presentation that he gave in Edinburgh on 31st October (Martin, 2018). With respect to creating 94 
rules for a prescriptive ban, Martin noted that “every time you think you’ve written [a rule] 95 
somebody says ‘what about one of those?’ and you’re back to square one again. Its 96 
considerably harder than it looks”. 97 
 98 
On 29th November, five months after Hackitt had initially refused to “ban combustible cladding”, 99 
the Government “banned combustible cladding”. As we write this article, the ban is still new – 100 
but, as Brian Martin noted, writing rules is hard. This paper examines the immediate 101 
consequences of the ban, and also identifies how unintended consequences may manifest – 102 
and how these may be mitigated. 103 
2. The Functional Requirement 104 
England’s Building Regulations have, since 1985, been based around the concept of functional 105 
requirements (Building Regulations, 1985). These functional requirements are qualitative 106 
statements about the performance that a building should achieve. In the case of fire safety, they 107 
require such things as appropriate escape routes, structures maintaining stability for a 108 
reasonable period, and (of course) that fire spread over the building envelope is adequately 109 
resisted. 110 
 111 
Until early 2019, the functional requirements were the only fire safety necessity that any building 112 
designer needed to achieve. However, deciding what constitutes appropriate or reasonable is 113 
difficult, and so, government also publishes a series of Approved Documents that give a set of 114 
prescriptive rules to assist designers in compliance with the functional requirements (Approved 115 
Document B - Volume 2 Buildings other than dwellinghouses, 2013, Approved Document B - 116 
Volume 1: Dwellings, 2019). 117 
 118 
Following these rules may be relied on as tending to negative liability (with respect to 119 
compliance with the functional requirements), but it is not a guarantee of compliance (The 120 




As a consequence, a competent designer must make a judgement about whether the rules are 123 
appropriate to every aspect of the building under consideration. Also, by necessity, the rules are 124 
generic and cannot prescribe every aspect of a building design, and designers are required to 125 
interpret whether their design complies with the rules or at least the intent of the rules. 126 
 127 
Therefore, if a designer applies the rules unthinkingly or without adequate skill and care, there is 128 
always a chance that they will create a building that is unsafe (because of some circumstance 129 
that the writers of the rulebook did not foresee, or because they misinterpreted the requirement 130 
or intent of a rule); and/or create a situation within a building that is inappropriate in some other 131 
way. 132 
 133 
A key feature of the system of functional requirements is that it allows (and even requires) the 134 
application of prescriptive rules to be moderated by common-sense and engineering 135 
understanding. Thus, new hazards that are inadequately controlled by the existing regulatory 136 
framework can be identified and addressed without the need for new regulations or new 137 
published prescriptive guidance. Furthermore, when the application of rules leads to a scenario 138 
that is clearly absurd, this can be corrected by following the intent of the rules – rather than the 139 
exact wording of the rules. 140 
 141 
A feature of this functionally based system is that any prescriptive measures are coupled to a 142 
statement of intent. For example, the prescriptive requirements for external walls in Approved 143 
Document B (prior to the 2019 update), were linked to three statements of intent: 144 
 145 
• If a designer was uncertain about how to interpret paragraph 12.7 of ADB, they could 146 
refer to paragraph 12.5 which identifies that “The external envelope of a building should 147 
not provide a medium for fire spread if it is likely to be a risk to health or safety”.  148 
 149 
• If there remained any uncertainty about the meaning of this paragraph, then a further 150 
statement of intent is provided within the Secretary of State’s view in that the 151 
requirements will be met if “the external walls are constructed so that the risk of ignition 152 
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from an external source and the spread of fire over their surfaces, is restricted, by 153 
making provision for them to have low rates of heat release”. 154 
 155 
• Finally, if the designer remains uncertain about whether their proposals are appropriate, 156 
they can evaluate them directly against the functional requirement which states that 157 
“The external walls of the building shall adequately resist the spread of fire over the 158 
walls and from one building to another, having regard to the height, use and position of 159 
the building”. 160 
 161 
These statements of intent provided additional context that collectively allow a designer to judge 162 
whether they have interpreted the guidance correctly. If there is any ambiguity in the specific 163 
guidance clauses, this can be clarified by referring to the statements of intent. If the prescriptive 164 
guidance delivers a solution that is absurd – the solution can be revised in the context of the 165 
overall intent.  166 
3. The Ban 167 
The ban that James Brokenshire announced on 29th of November 2018 (Brokenshire, 2018) 168 
was not a functional requirement. Instead, for the first time since the introduction of the Building 169 
Act of 1984, a prescriptive ‘fire safety’ measure for building work was written into statute – 170 
Regulations 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4). In his keynote presentation to the British Standards Fire Safety 171 
Conference on 21st May 2019, Chandru Dissanayeke of MHCLG, giving context for the “ban”, 172 
noted that “it is the responsibility of industry to ensure that fire doesn’t spread on the outside of 173 
a building; industry hasn’t been taking the seriously so we’ve had to take action”. He 174 
emphasised that the “ban” was necessary because “government doesn't trust industry” 175 
(Dissanayeke, 2019). 176 
 177 
The primary implication of writing a prescriptive rule in legislation is that Regulation 7(2) must be 178 
obeyed; to not obey Regulation 7(2) is to be in breach of the Building Regulations. The second 179 
implication is that expressing the new prescriptive rule in legislation removes any need to clarify 180 
the intent of the rule. The absence of this clarifying intent, and the rigid manner in which it must 181 
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be followed leads to consequences – some of these may have been intended by the lawmakers, 182 
some are likely to be unintended. 183 
 184 
It is the consequences of this legislative change that are the focus of this paper. The ban is still 185 
new and any legislative change can drive innovative practice as well as further “gaming” of the 186 
system. We have chosen to explore these issues through cases of which the authors have first-187 
hand experience, have featured in the media, or which logically follow from the context of the 188 
construction industry. We have deliberately avoided analysing potentially significant 189 
consequences for the materials and systems used to deliver building energy performance – as 190 
this is beyond our competence as fire safety engineers. 191 
4. Intended Consequences 192 
4.1 Omission of Combustible Elements of Construction 193 
Given the political context presented in the introduction, the most obvious intended 194 
consequence is to ban “Grenfell type” cladding (e.g. Aluminium Composite Panels with 195 
polyethylene filler and combustible insulation) from use on relevant buildings. In this regard, 196 
Regulation 7(2) seems to have been already been very successful and is likely to continue to be 197 
so. The reason we only say seems is because we cannot be sure whether the industry shift 198 
away from using combustible construction is directly because of Regulation 7(2), or whether it 199 
would have happened anyway: from our experience many funders, developers and contractors 200 
had taken the decision to avoid “Grenfell type” cladding before the changes were announced. 201 
 202 
Although Regulation 7(2) does not provide its own context, the government’s impact study (Final 203 
Impact Assessment, 2018) makes it clear that government intends to ban all combustible 204 
materials, not just “Grenfell type” cladding. Whether it is successful in this regard remains to be 205 
seen. As with any prescriptive requirement, much will depend on the robustness of the wording 206 
and degree to which practitioners find themselves able to “game” the system – a practice that 207 




For example, the new Regulation 7(2) bans combustible materials that become part of external 210 
walls. At first glance, this is pretty clear. However closer examination leads to a number of 211 
questions of which we have first hand experience: 212 
• What is a material as opposed to a product? Does government really mean to ban all 213 
combustible materials? Would this extend to the combustible binders within mineral 214 
wool insulation and paper on plasterboard? Neither of these materials, if tested on their 215 
own, can achieve European Class A2-s1,d0. Possible answers to this question may be 216 
found within the Approved Documents (Approved Document 7, 2013) – however, this 217 
immediately leaves Regulations 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4) open to interpretation. 218 
• The definition of external wall is also open to interpretation. For example, when an 219 
internal wall meets an external wall – does the cross section of the external wall now 220 
extend into the building until it reaches an occupied space? Based on experience of 221 
other prescriptive approaches, it is likely in time that this definition will be gamed, and it 222 
will be argued that certain components are not actually part of an external wall.  223 
 224 
The ban is also accompanied by a series of exemptions which are, no-doubt, provided because 225 
the writers of Regulation 7(2) have judged that current practice in the construction industry 226 
would be too significantly impacted unless exemptions are made. 227 
 228 
This list of exemptions introduces its own series of questions and possibilities for gaming. For 229 
example, membranes are exempt. What is a membrane? Any practitioner in the construction 230 
industry might currently believe that a membrane is a thin, vapour control layer or watertight 231 
layer (such as the EPDM membrane that was present at Grenfell Tower (Bisby, 2018)). 232 
However, this definition is open to interpretation. How long before a manufacturer decides to 233 
market their new combustible insulation product or cladding as a “membrane”? 234 
4.2 The Part B Backstop 235 
The answer to many of the questions raised above may be that it does not, in fact, matter. 236 
Although Regulation 7(2) now provides a prescriptive rule, it does not supersede or replace the 237 
requirements of Part B of the Building Regulations. Building designers must still consider their 238 




At the same time that the new Regulation 7 was introduced, the guidance of Approved 241 
Document B was also updated to make reference to the new Regulation (November 2018 242 
amendment to Approved Document B (fire safety) volume 2: buildings other than 243 
dwellinghouses, 2018). The Approved Documents were subsequently updated again in July 244 
2019 with the intent of providing greater clarity across the fully extent of the documents 245 
(Approved Document B - Volume 1: Dwellings, 2019). 246 
 247 
Consequently, while Regulation 7(2) may be potentially gamed – the functional requirements 248 
represent a “backstop” that require thought be given to whether the proposed solution does, in 249 
fact, adequately prevent fire spread. For example, an unscrupulous practitioner could attempt to 250 
classify a 3 mm thick sheet of polyethene as a “membrane” under Regulation 7(3) and therefore 251 
allow this material to be permitted on the building; however, when evaluated against the 252 
functional requirements of Part B it is our expectation that this product would be evaluated as 253 
inappropriate, and therefore prevented from being used. 254 
 255 
Regulation 7(2), can therefore only deliver adequate safety when considered together with Part 256 
B – and when culture and the system are fixed to eradicate gaming. Therefore, while the 257 
government have introduced the “ban” because they do not trust industry to ensure that fire 258 
does not spread on the outside of a building, the long-term success of the prescriptive “ban” 259 
relies on the functional requirements of Part B to ensure adequate safety.  The success of the 260 
“ban” therefore relies on the successful implementation of Hackitt’s broader recommendations – 261 
and the capacity of the industry to credibly regain the trust of the government. It is also 262 
somewhat ironic that the success of the “ban” is reliant on the success of the “defective 263 
regulation” (Question Time, 2018) that the government was trying to fix. 264 
4.3 Prohibition of High-Rise Timber Construction 265 
One immediate consequence of Regulation 7(2) is that engineered timber construction is 266 
included within the ban as, in practice, most current large scale engineered timber buildings are 267 
constructed with cross laminated timber as an element of structure within the external wall. The 268 




“The policy prohibits the use of timber materials in the external wall of buildings within the 271 
scope. Currently the number of projects above 18m in height where load bearing structural 272 
timber elements are used remains relatively small. The effect of the ban on the use of 273 
engineered timber remains limited in the short term. There is however a growing number of 274 
buildings above 18m in height using engineered timber as part of their structure. Engineered 275 
timber offers an alternative to traditional methods of construction in buildings within the scope of 276 
the policy. It is therefore likely to slow down the use of engineered timber in future development 277 
in the medium to long term.” 278 
 279 
From this statement, we conclude that engineered timber being “scuppered” (Cousins, 2019) by 280 
the ban appears to have been a conscious choice by government. The purposeful nature of this 281 
decision is further emphasised by the long list of exemptions under Regulation 7(3). It would, no 282 
doubt, have been possible to draft an exemption targeted at engineered timber – the absence of 283 
such an exemption suggests that the government has used Grenfell Tower as political cover for 284 
prohibiting a form of construction that has proliferated in recent years. It is ironic that, although 285 
Dianne Abbot was quick to press the government for the “ban”, the Labour Hackney council in 286 
her constituency has been “keen to promote the benefits of building with wood” (Hackney puts 287 
wood first, 2012) – actively promoting (Stops, 2016) buildings that would now be banned under 288 
Regulation 7(2). 289 
 290 
Since the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire, The Royal Institute of British 291 
Architects (RIBA) have also been consistent in their recommendation for a ban on combustible 292 
external wall construction (Waite, 2017; Dobson, 2018). With respect to the use of engineered 293 
timber, some of their leading members now find their activities swept up in the ban. With calls 294 
for a “common sense approach” as the manner of the prohibition emerged in Autumn 2018 295 
(Dunton, 2018), some appear to have realised too late that this form of construction was 296 
vulnerable to the inflexible adherence to prescriptive rules – and that common sense is not 297 
relevant in the face of a statutory prescription. Leading practitioners in this area are already 298 
indicating that they are considering how they can change how external walls for timber 299 
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structures are designed – to get around Regulation 7(2) (Jessel, 2018). Time will tell whether 300 
this change will be to omit timber from the external wall, or whether designers will seek to 301 
administratively re-define the external wall such that, according to this new definition, “internal” 302 
elements of the external wall can be timber. 303 
 304 
The evidence suggests that engineered timber was not an unfortunate victim of the ban on 305 
combustible materials, but an active target of the new Regulation 7. If practitioners invest time 306 
and resources to re-engineer their schemes to remove timber from the external walls – we 307 
would suggest that there is the real possibility that government may introduce new rules to 308 
specifically target this form of construction. A key motivation for the engineered timber industry 309 
should therefore be to provide evidence to government that this form of construction should be 310 
one of the exempted products – by spending time to genuinely address safety concerns rather 311 
than gaming Regulation 7 (Law and Hadden, 2017; Deeny et al., 2018; Law, Hadden and Bisby, 312 
2019). 313 
4.4 Banning Desktop Studies 314 
The rigidity of Regulation 7(2) now means that it is not possible to use a “desktop study” to 315 
demonstrate compliance with the requirement. Dame Hackitt identified that “assessments in lieu 316 
of tests (also known as ‘desktop studies’) should only be used in a very limited number of 317 
cases”. Furthermore, much of the media coverage following the Grenfell Tower fire focused on 318 
desktop studies. From this, it seems likely that the banning of desktop studies (in order to 319 
demonstrate adherence to Regulation 7) is an intended consequence of the legislation. 320 
 321 
Although the use of desktop studies is restricted in relation to the scope of Regulation 7(2), 322 
there is still the possibility to use large scale testing to demonstrate compliance with the 323 
recommendations of Approved Document B. In this context, the use of desktop studies appears 324 
likely to be standardised in the form of the proposed BS 9414 (Draft BS 9414, 2019). Given the 325 
number of system variables that the draft BS 9414 identifies as “not possible to change” – it 326 
seems likely (and indeed we have already encountered cases) where BS 9414 not only limits 327 
the extent to which desktop studies can be used – but also effectively limits the degree to which 328 
BS 8414 (BS 8414, 2015) can be applied to any project. 329 
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5. Unintended Consequences? 330 
5.1 Devaluation of Property 331 
Since June 2017, a large number of buildings have been identified that have combustible 332 
cladding. The government maintains a list of buildings that have been identified as having 333 
“unsafe” cladding that were identified as part of the screening process that was set-up in the 334 
days after the Grenfell Tower fire. Where buildings have been deemed unsafe, the government 335 
has indicated that owners should undertake remedial works. To assist with this, central 336 
government has made £400 million (MHCLG Position Statement, 2018) of funding available to 337 
Local Authorities to ensure that there is sufficient financial resource available to undertake the 338 
work. 339 
 340 
In the case of privately-owned blocks, the government has called on owners to “do the right 341 
thing” and undertake the remedial work. However, the degree to which this request has been 342 
met with action appears to be limited (MHCLG Position Statement, 2018). It is the authors’ 343 
observation that private companies may have a limited appetite for undertaking multi-million-344 
pound remedial works in the absence of a legal mechanism that compels them to do so. In fact, 345 
our experience is that in many cases, there is no private company to “do the right thing” 346 
because the companies have either “gone bust” or been deliberately dissolved after 347 
construction. Apparently in recognition that “too many building owners have failed to take 348 
responsibility” and that “many leaseholder face unfair, and often substantial costs”, on 9th May 349 
2019, a further £200 million was announced in an attempt to enable leaseholders in private 350 
blocks to undertake remedial work (Brokenshire, 2019). 351 
 352 
It is notable that Regulation 7(2) has, in effect, raised the bar with respect to the level of safety 353 
delivered by England’s Building Regulations. Prior to this regulation it would have been possible 354 
to use some combination of combustible cladding materials – for example by testing a system in 355 
accordance with BS 8414 and classifying it in accordance with BR 135 (Colwell and Baker, 356 




A key question in relation to many existing buildings is: was Regulation 7(2) introduced because 359 
the government believed that the level of safety in Approved Document B was too low; OR was 360 
Regulation 7(2) introduced because the government had lost faith in the industry’s ability to 361 
follow the guidance in ADB? 362 
 363 
This is a question of paramount importance for the owners of flats in many affected buildings as 364 
the authors have experience of building control authorities, fire services, insurers and mortgage 365 
providers who have expressed the view that the new Regulation 7(2)* is an indication that 366 
buildings that previously complied with ADB – are no longer considered by government to be 367 
adequately safe. 368 
 369 
This means that there are a number of buildings that fall into a compliance gap; that is, buildings 370 
where the cladding systems that complied Building Regulations when they were built, but do not 371 
comply with the Building Regulations 2018. In theory, this does not matter – existing buildings 372 
are not required to comply with new regulations. However, in practice, the authors are aware of 373 
instances where mortgage providers have refused to lend money on, and regulatory enforcers 374 
have insisted on remediation of, flats in buildings that include any cladding materials that are not 375 
of A2 (European class) or better – regardless of whether the building complied with ADB when it 376 
was built. This has led to situations where private residents have concluded that the only way to 377 
maintain (or recoup) the value of their property is to replace the cladding. However, these 378 
residents have also found that they have no recourse to developers or building warranty 379 
providers – as all parties agree that the building complied with the original regulations.  380 
 381 
The compliance gap, whether intended or unintended, is a consequence of the “ban” that has 382 
forced residents to pay (either directly, or via the government’s private funding scheme) for 383 
cladding to be replaced in situations where it had previously been deemed adequately safe. 384 
This number of properties affected by this compliance gap may increase as government 385 
extends its research and recommendations beyond the immediate concern of ACM cladding, or 386 
 
* In addition to guidance in relation to Category 2 ACM in MHCLG Advice Note 11. 
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it could decrease if government takes heed of results which suggest that some combustible 387 
cladding materials can be adequately safe. 388 
 389 
While the support for leaseholders is to be welcomed, it is worth noting that, taken as a whole, 390 
the construction sector responsible for designing and installed “unsafe” cladding is now being 391 
subsidised by government to remediate its own “defective” work.  392 
5.2 Elimination of Consequence 393 
In her evidence to the Select Committee, Dame Judith stated that “if people attach too much 394 
reliance upon banning activities and particular materials as being a solution to this problem, it 395 
will create a false sense of security”. It is our view that this has the potential to be one of the 396 
most significant unintended consequences of Regulation 7(2).  397 
 398 
Practitioners may believe that if they comply with Regulation 7(2), then they don’t need to worry 399 
about meeting Part B. If this view prevails, then it follows that practitioners may feel that they 400 
have no responsibility for their solutions – as they are defined by government. Where the 401 
building designer does not hold responsibility for their solutions, competence to evaluate 402 
proposed solutions against Part B becomes irrelevant. A perceived lack of design responsibility 403 
therefore reduces the need for designers and contractors to be competent in relation to 404 
understanding the risk presented by a given external wall construction. This may lead (over 405 
time) to a situation where any residual competence present in the industry is lost – the opposite 406 
of the objectives of the Hackitt review.  407 
 408 
A further consequence of the “ban” is the concern that the problems with the construction 409 
industry will be perceived as being “fixed” – and that political will to implement wider 410 
recommendations of Hackitt’s Final Report may ebb away. 411 
5.3 Minor Unintended Consequences 412 
There is also a raft of other more minor consequences that appear to be unintended.  413 
 414 
Regulation 7(2) states that all materials should be tested in accordance with “BS EN 13501-415 
1:2007+A1:2009 (ISBN 978 0 580 59861 6) published by the British Standards Institution on 416 
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30th March 2007 and amended in November 2009”. As discussed above, a high level of 417 
specificity is necessary for any prescriptive regulation in order to minimise the extent to which a 418 
rule can be “gamed”. However, the level of specificity with the exact document that should be 419 
used is curious as it appears to preclude any product that is classified against, for example the 420 
German standard DIN EN 13501. This means that any product for sale in the English market 421 
place must be classified in accordance with the British version of the standard. In the context of 422 
Brexit, perhaps this is intentional – but it does appear curious as it can leave otherwise saleable 423 
products “non-compliant” when they enter the English market.  424 
 425 
It is worth noting that in the Approved Document series, the standards are also referred to as 426 
British Standards – but this is simply guidance, so any engineer can recognise that a product 427 
classified in accordance with DIN EN 13501 has the same status as a product classified in 428 
accordance with BS EN 13501. In the case of the new Regulation 7(2) – there is not the same 429 
flexibility. 430 
 431 
In a similar manner, the latest version of BS EN 13501 is BS EN 13501-1:2018. As a 432 
consequence, some testing laboratories have already updated their classification 433 
documentation to accord with the new test. Any certificate issued in accordance with the 2018 434 
version of the standard does not comply with the regulation. To be compliant with Regulation 435 
7(2), it must be reclassified in accordance with the old standard. 436 
 437 
This level of administrative absurdity is perhaps a price that government has deemed worth 438 
paying in order to achieve the intended consequences of the ban. However, we cannot let it 439 
pass unremarked. 440 
 441 
In addition to the somewhat absurd administrative consequences, there are also somewhat 442 
absurd practical consequences. 443 
 444 
For example, while the new regulation applies to external wall, it does not apply to flat roofs. In 445 
many modern buildings, it is common to provide PIR/PF/PUR/polystyrene insulation over the top 446 
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of the structural slab that forms the roof of the building. In apartments, it is also common to 447 
provide a top “penthouse” level that is stepped back from the edge of the building. This leads to 448 
an immediate question of: where does the wall stop, and the roof start? We have already seen 449 
projects where contractors have removed an arbitrary perimeter of PU/PIR from a roof in order 450 
to ensure that this does not accidentally become classified as the external wall. As with the 451 
previous examples, this is perhaps a small price to pay for the success of the ban – but it 452 
demonstrates that the introduction of a prescriptive rule can lead to absurd design situations – 453 
that cannot be resolved by application of engineering or common sense – they can only be 454 
resolved in legal terms. 455 
6. Conclusion 456 
The ban on combustible cladding was introduced because the English government did not trust 457 
industry to ensure that fire does not spread on the outside of a building. The ban appears to 458 
have been broadly effective in prohibiting many of the materials about which the government 459 
was (rightly) concerned. However, we have concluded the long-term effectiveness of the ban 460 
can only be sustained if the existing regulatory regime functions adequately, and that the 461 
competent application of Part B serves as a “backstop” to any inappropriate gaming of 462 
Regulation 7. 463 
 464 
As such, we conclude that the measures in Regulation 7 represent a patch (or in the language 465 
of Brian Martin, “the biggest regulatory hammer I can find”) to induce an immediate change in 466 
the practice of the construction industry. This risks being a classic case of knee-jerk regulation – 467 
or design by disaster (Spinardi, Bisby and Torero, 2017). Unless the wider issues identified by 468 
Dame Hackitt are also addressed, other building safety issues will periodically emerge. 469 
Therefore, adopting the language of Brian Martin, MHCLG will need to use their metaphorical 470 
hammer in a never-ending game of whack-a-mole. 471 
 472 
We have observed that the effectiveness of the ban has also come at a cost. Some of these 473 
apparent costs (for example the immediate impact on engineering timber), appear to have been 474 
intentional. Some of these costs are obviously absurd in that they simply generate an 475 
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administrative loop that must be obeyed – but these costs are potentially acceptable to 476 
government (and perhaps society) given the overall effectiveness of the ban.  477 
 478 
There are, however, potential unintended consequences that are of more concern. Any 479 
prescriptive rule is vulnerable to gaming, and the new Regulation 7 – with its list of exemptions 480 
certainly has this potential to be gamed. The ban appears to force, on the grounds of safety, 481 
lease holders to pay for the replacement cladding that was previously deemed safe – simply to 482 
retain the value of their asset. The ban also presents an opportunity for designers to potentially 483 
avoid taking design responsibility for their proposals – the exact opposite of the outcome that 484 
Dame Judith is seeking as part of her reforms. With respect to this, we can only reinforce the 485 
point that designers must still comply with Part B of the Building Regulations, and that 486 
government follows the advice of Hackitt to prioritise cultural change and outcomes focused 487 
regulation. 488 
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